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We investigate the determinants of capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan African countries, 
including 24 countries classified as severely indebted low-income countries, for the 
period 1970-1996.  The econometric analysis reveals that external borrowing is positively 
and significantly related to capital flight, suggesting that to a large extent capital flight is 
debt-fueled.  We estimate that for every dollar of external borrowing in the region, 
roughly 80 cents flowed back as capital flight in the same year.  Capital flight also 
exhibits a high degree of persistence in the sense that past capital flight is correlated with 
current and future capital flight.  The growth rate differential between the African country 
and its OECD trading partners is negatively related to capital flight.  We also explore the 
effects of several other factors – inflation, fiscal policy indicators, the interest rate 
differential, exchange rate appreciation, financial development, and indicators of the 
political environment and governance.  We discuss the implications of the results for debt 
relief and for policies aimed at preventing capital flight and attracting private capital held 
abroad. 
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 Public Debts and Private Assets: 





We investigate the determinants of capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan African countries, 
including 24 countries classified as severely indebted low-income countries, for the 
period 1970-1996.  The econometric analysis reveals that external borrowing is positively 
and significantly related to capital flight, suggesting that to a large extent capital flight is 
debt-fueled.  We estimate that for every dollar of external borrowing in the region, 
roughly 80 cents flowed back as capital flight in the same year.  Capital flight also 
exhibits a high degree of persistence in the sense that past capital flight is correlated with 
current and future capital flight.  The growth rate differential between the African country 
and its OECD trading partners is negatively related to capital flight.  We also explore the 
effects of several other factors – inflation, fiscal policy indicators, the interest rate 
differential, exchange rate appreciation, financial development, and indicators of the 
political environment and governance.  We discuss the implications of the results for debt 





“Africa is suffering from multiple crises… Billions of dollars of public funds continue to 
be stashed away by some African leaders, even while roads are crumbling, health 
systems have failed, school-children have neither books nor desks nor teachers, and the 
phones do not work.”  






The high level of external indebtedness is both a symptom and a cause of the poor 
economic performance in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries in recent decades.  In the 
1990s, average debt service payments amounted to roughly 6.5% of national income in 
the 30 SSA countries discussed in this study.  At the same time, these countries have 
experienced massive private outflows of funds, a phenomenon often described as “capital 
flight.”1  Recent estimates show that the region is a “net creditor” to the rest of the world 
in the sense that private assets held abroad as measured by accumulated capital flight 
exceed total liabilities as measured by the stock of debt (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001).  
The existing evidence also indicates that compared to other developing regions, SSA has 
a larger share of private wealth held abroad (Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2001).  For 
these reasons, it is important to examine the causes of capital flight from the region. 
 
This study investigates the determinants of capital flight from 30 SSA countries 
for the period 1970-1996.  For this purpose we use estimates of capital flight reported by 
Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) for 24 countries that are classified as severely indebted 
low-income countries (SILICs), plus comparable estimates for six other SSA countries.2  
The estimates of capital flight are obtained using a modified version of the “residual” 
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method, which is based on the difference between inflows of foreign exchange and the 
recorded uses of foreign exchange.  Our econometric results indicate that foreign 
borrowing is positively and significantly related to capital flight, and that to a substantial 
extent capital flight is debt-fueled.  Capital flight also exhibits a high degree of 
persistence, in that past capital flight is correlated with current and future capital flight.  
The growth rate differential between the African country and its OECD trading partners 
is negatively related to capital flight, as is an index of voice and accountability.   
 
 These results have important implications for debt relief and for policies aimed at 
addressing the problem of capital flight from African countries.  The use of foreign 
borrowing to finance the accumulation of private external assets raises the questions as to 
the legal and moral legitimacy of the external debt – that is, its treatment as a public 
obligation as opposed to a private liability.  Debt relief will bring sustainable benefits to 
African people only if it is accompanied by strategies designed to prevent a new cycle of 
external borrowing and capital flight in the post-relief period.  These strategies must 
involve enforcing responsible lending practices on the part of creditors and transparent 
and accountable debt management on the part of African governments.  At the same time, 
the success of African countries in preventing further capital flight and in attracting 
private capital held abroad will depend on their success in implementing policies that 
promote economic growth and a stable macroeconomic environment. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
(a) Capital flight from indebted countries: a paradox? 
Developing countries have experienced simultaneously high levels of external 
borrowing and massive outflows of private capital.  This phenomenon has been 
particularly notable in sub-Saharan Africa.  Recent estimates indicate that compared to 
other regions, Africa has a larger proportion of private wealth held abroad (Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2001).  At the same time, this region includes the largest number of 
countries defined by the World Bank as “severely indebted low-income countries” 
(SILICs).3  Estimates by Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) for the period 1970-1996 reveal 
that this group of countries is a “net creditor” to the rest of the world in the sense that 
accumulated capital flight exceeds the stock of external debt.  This poses the question of 
why countries borrow heavily at the same time that capital is fleeing abroad. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, capital movements can be attributed to portfolio 
choice decisions by individual investors guided by profit maximization based on risk-
adjusted returns to capital.  In a world of complete information and negligible 
transactions costs, the rates of return to capital would be expected to equalize across 
countries and markets, so that agents are indifferent between investing domestically and 
investing abroad.  In such a world, evidence of systematic capital outflows would imply 
that returns to capital are systematically higher abroad than at home.  Following the logic 
of diminishing returns, the rate of return to capital should be higher in capital-scarce 
developing countries than in richer countries, and capital should flow from the latter 
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towards the former.  If investment is riskier in developing countries, the net risk-adjusted 
returns may be lower, and this could explain why capital continues to flow in the opposite 
direction.  But if the risky environment discourages domestic investment, it might be 
expected to discourage investment by foreigners as well.  The question, as Pastor (1990: 
7) puts it, is “if the investment climate in a country is negative enough to push out local 
capital, why would savvy international bankers extend their own capital in the form of 
loans?”   
 
The literature on capital flight has offered a range of explanations for this 
apparent paradox in international capital movements.  One set of explanations focuses on 
asymmetric risks of expropriation of domestic and foreign assets (Khan and Haque 1985; 
Cuddington 1986).  Domestic agents are assumed to face a risk of government 
expropriation of their assets, while foreign capital is guaranteed against this risk by the 
debtor government and/or by international institutions.  Risk asymmetry could also arise 
from differential tax treatment of domestic and foreign assets.  In such a context, private 
agents maximize portfolio gains by investing abroad, even as foreign lenders find it 
profitable to issue loans, so that capital flight and foreign borrowing occur 
simultaneously.  Alesina and Tabellini (1989) add political economy considerations to 
this explanation, suggesting that the incumbent government is happy to accumulate 
foreign debt since it does not internalize the burden that this will place on future (possibly 
rival) regimes and on future generations.   
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A second set of explanations posits direct causal links between capital flight and 
external debt.  The causal relationships can run both ways; that is, foreign borrowing can 
cause capital flight, while at the same time capital flight can lead to more foreign 
borrowing.  Boyce (1992) distinguishes four possible causal links.  In the first, foreign 
borrowing causes capital flight by contributing to an increased likelihood of a debt crisis, 
worsening macroeconomic conditions, and the deterioration of the general investment 
climate.  In such cases of debt-driven capital flight, “capital flees a country in response to 
economic circumstances attributable to the external debt itself” (Boyce 1992: 337).  In 
the second, foreign borrowing provides the resources as well as a motive for channeling 
private capital abroad, a phenomenon Boyce (1992: 338) terms debt-fueled capital flight.  
In such cases, funds borrowed abroad (by the government or by private borrowers with 
government guarantees) are re-exported as private assets.  In some cases, the funds may 
never even leave the creditor bank, simply being transferred into an international private 
banking account at the same institution (Henry 1986).  In the other two linkages, capital 
flight causes foreign borrowing.  In the case of flight-driven external borrowing, capital 
flight drains national foreign exchange resources, forcing the government to borrow 
abroad.  In the case of flight-fueled external borrowing, flight capital directly provides 
the resources to finance foreign loans to the same residents who export their capital, a 
phenomenon known as “round-tripping” or “back-to-back loans,” motivated by the desire 
to obtain government guarantees on foreign borrowing, or by the need to devise a pretext 
for unexplained wealth.   
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A potentially important but politically sensitive factor that seldom has been 
pursued seriously in the empirical analysis of capital flight is the role of embezzlement of 
borrowed money by government leaders.  Like natural resources, foreign loans are 
‘lootable’ resources that corrupt leaders can appropriate for private enrichment and 
channel abroad for safekeeping.  Ndikumana and Boyce (1998) offer evidence that this 
was a major contributor to capital flight in the Congo (formerly known as Zaïre) under 
the Mobutu regime.  Similarly, Boyce (1992, 1993) reviews evidence suggesting that this 
type of debt-fueled capital flight was widespread during the rule of Ferdinand Marcos in 
the Philippines. 
 
Econometric analysis may be able to shed light on the relative strength of the 
possible linkages between external borrowing and capital flight.  In the case of debt-
driven capital flight, it is the stock of external debt rather than annual flows of borrowing 
that would be expected to have the strongest effect on annual capital flight.  Similarly, 
flight-driven external borrowing would be mediated by the stock of foreign reserves.  The 
phenomena of debt-fueled capital flight and flight-fueled external borrowing, on the other 
hand, would be expected to generate tighter year-to-year correlations between annual 
flows of external borrowing and capital flight.  
 
Countries that have experienced high levels of capital flight in the recent past are 
likely to experience higher capital flight in subsequent years.  This is due in part to the 
momentum created by capital flight itself.  For example, for a given level of government 
expenditure, the presence of high capital flight may lead private agents to expect higher 
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tax rates by virtue of the resulting lower tax base.  The consequent decline in expected 
after-tax returns discourages domestic investment and induces private agents to seek 
higher returns abroad (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo 2001).  Moreover, capital flight may 
be ‘habit-forming,’ making investors unlikely to respond rapidly to any improvements in 
the investment climate. 
 
(b) Empirical evidence on the determinants of capital flight 
There is a substantial empirical literature on the determinants of capital flight, 
originating in the 1980s with studies primarily on Latin American countries.  Although 
results vary, due in part to differences in the measurement of capital flight and 
differences in econometric techniques and specifications, some important empirical 
regularities have emerged.  Table 1 summarizes the main findings from a selection of 17 
studies on developing countries.  In what follows, we briefly discuss the factors that have 
been most emphasized in the literature. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Capital inflows 
 The single most consistent finding in empirical studies is that the annual flow of 
external borrowing is an important determinant of capital flight.  This relationship has 
been established in single-country time-series studies as well as large-sample cross-
sectional and pooled data studies, and it is generally robust to alternative specifications of 
the capital flight equation, measures of capital flight, and econometric estimation 
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methodologies.  These findings suggest that debt-fueled capital flight has been a 
widespread phenomenon.  Flight-fueled external borrowing could also contribute to this 
result.  Using an instrumental variable approach to test for possible simultaneities, Boyce 
(1992, 1993) concludes that the causal relationships ran in both directions in the 
Philippines. 
 
Relatively few empirical studies have examined the impact of the stock of debt as 
opposed to debt flows on capital flight.  As discussed above, a high debt overhang can 
drive capital flight by worsening the macroeconomic environment and increasing the 
likelihood of a debt crisis.  On the other hand, a high stock of debt might also be 
interpreted as evidence of creditworthiness, signaling higher expected availability of 
foreign exchange, and thereby reducing the incentives for capital flight.  Vos (1992) finds 
that the debt stock had no statistically significant impact on capital flight from the 
Philppines, while Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (2001), in a cross-sectional study, report 
a statistically significant positive impact (that is, a higher debt stock leads to greater 
capital flight).   
 
 A few studies have investigated the role of other types of capital inflows as 
explanatory variables.  Hermes and Lensink (2000) and Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde 
(2000) include development aid in addition to private lending, and find that it too has a 
positive effect, suggesting that capital flight can be fueled by grants as well as by loans.  
Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde (2000) also include direct foreign investment as an 
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explanatory variable, and find that it has no statistically significant effect on capital 
flight. 
 
 Several empirical studies (Mikelsen 1991; Vos 1992) have reported a positive 
correlation between past capital flight and current capital flight, suggesting that capital 
flight tends to persist over time.  This finding has been less robust, however, with some 
studies reporting insignificant or negative effects (Cuddington 1987; Boyce 1992; Nyoni 
2000). 
 
The macroeconomic environment 
The indicators of the macroeconomic environment that have been used most 
frequently in empirical studies of capital flight are inflation and the growth rate of 
income.  A high expected inflation makes assets denominated in domestic currency less 
attractive compared to those denominated in foreign currency.  Inflation can also be 
regarded “as an indicator of the overall ability of the government to manage the 
economy” (Fischer 1993: 487).  Several empirical studies have found evidence that high 
inflation encourages capital flight (see Table 1).  Note, however, that the causality can 
also run in the reverse direction:  as capital flight erodes the tax base, the government 
may resort to money creation to finance the fiscal deficit.  “Inflation may be the origin of 
capital flight, but once it takes place it has in itself a powerful inflationary impact,” 
Dornbusch (1987: 148) remarks.  “In the end it is hard to identify which is the chicken 
and which is the egg.”  
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Empirical evidence also supports the hypothesis that capital flight is higher when 
a country’s rate of economic growth is low.  Pastor (1990) finds that the growth rate 
differential between the USA and Latin American countries is an important determinant 
of capital flight from the region.  Nyoni (2000) relates capital flight from Tanzania to the 
growth rate differential between Tanzania and the United Kingdom, and obtains a similar 
result.  The empirical evidence is more mixed with regard to the effect of a country’s 
growth rate alone on capital flight, with a number of studies finding that the effect is 
either not significant or not robust to alternative specifications and estimation 
methodologies.  This may reflect the fact that economic growth is itself affected by some 
of the same factors that cause capital flight, making it difficult to isolate its independent 
effects. 
 
 None of the empirical studies reviewed here examines the ratio of exports to GDP 
as a possible determinant of capital flight.  Yet in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, this 
may be a relevant feature of the macroeconomic environment.  Exports not only provide 
a source of foreign exchange and (through underinvoicing) a mechanism for capital 
flight, but also often are an arena for rent-seeking activities by politically powerful 
parastatal and private actors, particularly in the cases of minerals and agricultural 
commodities.4  
 
Fiscal policy  
Several studies find that government budget deficits are positively related to 
capital flight; that is, a higher deficit (or lower surplus) is associated with greater capital 
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flight.  Research on this topic is still scant in the case of sub-Saharan African economies, 
however, for which the only study that we have been able to identify (Hermes and 
Lensink 1992) finds no evidence of a statistically significant link between fiscal deficits 
and capital flight.  This topic deserves further attention, given the chronic budget deficits 
that many sub-Saharan African countries have experienced over the years. 
 
 Another fiscal policy indicator that has been explored in some studies is taxation.  
There are three main ways in which taxation is thought to affect capital flight, apart from 
its effect on the fiscal balance.  First, ceteris paribus, expected high tax rates imply lower 
expected net returns to domestic investment.  Second, volatility of the tax rate results in 
higher investment risk and lower risk-adjusted returns to domestic investment.  Third, 
discriminatory tax treatment in favor of foreign assets (often used to attract foreign 
capital) may also discourage domestic investment.  Hermes and Lensink (2000) find a 
positive link between capital flight and uncertainty of government tax policy.5  Studies 
that include the tax/GDP ratio directly (as opposed to its unpredictable component) have 
not found a statistically significant link between taxation and capital flight (Pastor 1990; 
Vos 1992; Hermes and Lensink 1992), suggesting that it is the policy uncertainty of 
taxation that matters most for portfolio decisions.   
 
In general, it is problematic to characterize a government’s fiscal policy stance by 
means of a single variable such as the budget deficit or the tax rate (see MacKenzie 
(1989) for a survey of literature on this topic).  Moreover, the quality of data on fiscal 
policy variables reported in international databases is often poor, especially in the case of 
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developing countries.  Hence, empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy must be 
interpreted cautiously. 
 
Risk and returns to investment 
Indicators of risk and returns to investment have been examined as determinants 
of capital flight, based on portfolio choice theory.  Investors are assumed to seek to 
maximize profits by allocating funds between domestic and foreign investment based on 
the relative risk-adjusted rate of return at home and abroad.  Various indicators have been 
used to test this theory: the interest rate differential (that is, the domestic rate minus the 
foreign rate), exchange rate movements, and survey-based measures of institutional 
investor risk perceptions.  As indicated in Table 1, a number of studies have found that 
differential risk-adjusted returns have statistically significant effects in the expected 
direction.  Dooley (1988), for example, finds that financial repression, characterized by 
artificially low domestic deposit interest rates, is an important determinant of capital 
flight.  Studies of capital flight from African countries, however, have found no 
significant relationship between interest rates and the magnitude of capital flight (Hermes 
and Lensink 1992; Murinde, Hermes and Lensink 1996; Nyoni 2000; Ng’eno 2000). 
 
There is also some evidence that in SSA and elsewhere exchange rate 
overvaluation leads to capital flight.6  When the national currency is overvalued, the 
expectation that the currency will depreciate induces private investors/savers to shift their 
portfolio composition in favor of foreign assets (Cuddington 1986, 1987).  As an 
alternative to the exchange rate, Olopoenia (2000) and Nyoni (2000) use the “black 
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market” premium (i.e., the difference between market and official exchange rates) as an 
explanatory variable, but find it to have no statistically significant effect on capital flight. 
 
Investor-based survey data also have been used to investigate the effects of risk 
perceptions on capital flight.  Noting that risk ratings are related to other determinants of 
capital flight, such as macroeconomic policy uncertainty and economic performance 
indicators, Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (2001) extract the unpredictable components of 




The role of financial intermediation has received relatively little attention in the 
empirical literature on capital flight.  In principle, financial development can reduce 
capital flight if accompanied by an expansion of opportunities for domestic portfolio 
diversification.  However, financial deepening can also encourage capital flight if it 
facilitates international capital transfers.  In particular, if financial markets are liberalized 
and international capital movements are deregulated, then domestic capital may be 
expected to flow abroad as long as risk-adjusted returns are higher elsewhere.  Lensink, 
Hermes, and Murinde (1998) find a negative and significant effect of demand deposits on 
capital flight.  Using the M2/GDP ratio as a measure of financial development,7 Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Pattillo (2001) find that it has no statistically significant effect.   
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Political and governance factors 
A few studies have examined the effects of political and governance factors on 
capital flight.  We would expect that political instability and poor governance would 
contribute to poor economic performance, high uncertainty, and a negative overall 
investment climate, all of which would be likely to discourage domestic investment and 
encourage capital flight.  Empirical evidence on the direct effects of political and 
governance factors remains rather sparse, however.  In part, this may be due to the lack of 
reliable measures for these factors.  In large cross-sectional studies, however, Hermes and 
Lensik (2000) and Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde (2000) have found that holding other 
factors constant, political instability and war lead to greater capital flight, and that 




The present study examines the determinants of capital flight from 30 sub-
Saharan African countries for the period 1970-1996.  Our sample includes 24 SSA 
countries that are classified as severely indebted low-income countries (SILICs), for 
which estimates of capital flight are presented by Boyce and Ndikumana (2001).  In this 
study, we add another six SSA countries that are not classified as SILICs, but for which 
the necessary data to estimate capital flight are available (Benin, Gabon, Mauritius, 
Senegal, Togo, and Zimbabwe).  The capital flight series for the 30 SSA countries is 
presented in Table A1 in the appendix.  The panel structure of the data set, embodying 
both time-series and cross-country variations in capital flight and its potential 
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determinants, increases the number of observations and hence the degrees of freedom 
compared to single-country studies.  Detailed information on the definitions of variables 
used in the analysis and data sources is presented in Table A2.  The country means of the 
variables are reported in Table A3.   
 
(a) Capital flight 
The empirical literature has advanced a number of approaches to measuring 
capital flight (for discussions, see Lessard and Williamson 1987; Vos 1992; and Ajayi 
1997).  The measure used in this study is derived using the methodology described by 
Boyce and Ndikumana (2001).  For country i in year t, capital flight is computed as 
follows:  
itititititit MISINVRESCADFIDEBTADJKF +∆+−+∆= )(   (1) 
where DEBTADJ∆  is the change in the country’s stock of external debt (adjusted for 
cross-currency exchange rate fluctuations, so as to take into account the fact that debt is 
denominated in various currencies and then aggregated in US dollars); DFI is net direct 
foreign investment; CA is the current account deficit; RES∆  is the change in the stock of 
international reserves; and MISINV is net trade misinvoicing.  This is a variant of the 
“residual” method for the computation of capital flight, used by the World Bank (1985) 
among others, based on the difference between the inflows of foreign exchange from 
external borrowing (as reported in the World Bank’s World Debt Tables) and the uses of 
foreign exchange reported in the IMF’s Balance-of-Payments Tables.  We refine this 
measure by incorporating adjustments for trade misinvoicing and for the impact of 
exchange rate fluctuations on the dollar value of external debt.8  The nominal values of 
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annual capital flight are converted to real values using the US producer price index (base 
1996 = 100).   
 
 Table 2 summarizes the magnitude of capital flight from SSA countries.  Real 
capital flight over the 27-year period amounted to about $187 billion for the 30 countries.  
Including imputed interest earnings, the accumulated stock of capital flight was about 
$274 billion as of end-1996.  As a whole, this group of SSA countries is a “net creditor” 
to the rest of the world in the sense that their private assets held abroad, as measured by 
capital flight including interest earnings, exceed their total liabilities as measured by the 
stock of external debt.  Their net external assets (accumulated flight capital minus 
accumulated external debt) amounted to approximately $85 billion. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 The volume of capital flight varies substantially across countries.  In terms of 
absolute magnitude, Angola, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Nigeria have the highest stocks of capital flight.  The ratio of capital flight 
stock to GDP exceeds 200% for eight countries, with a weighted average ratio of 172% 
for the group.  Five of the 30 countries (Benin, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) exhibit a 
“negative” stock of flight capital, indicating that their recorded capital inflows exceed 
recorded uses of foreign exchange.9 
 
(b) Independent variables 
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Capital flows and stocks 
As a measure of capital inflows, we use the annual change in the total debt stock 




As indicators of the macroeconomic environment, we use annual growth rate of 
real per capita GDP; the growth rate differential between the African country and the 
USA; the growth rate differential between the country and its OECD trading partners 
(weighted average by trade shares); the annual inflation rate measured by the percentage 
change in the consumer price index; the inflation rate differential between the country 
and the USA; and exports as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Fiscal policy 
As indicators of the fiscal policy we use the primary budget deficit, the overall 
fiscal deficit, and the tax/GDP ratio. 
 
Risk and returns to investment 
As indicators of the returns to domestic investment, we use the percentage change 
in the real exchange rate (index 1990=100) as an indicator of the risk associated with 
investing domestically; the domestic deposit rate; the spread between the domestic 
lending rate and the deposit rate; and the difference between the domestic deposit rate 
and the U.S. Treasury bill rate with an adjustment for depreciation of the local currency 
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(that is, the domestic deposit rate minus the U.S. Treasury bill rate minus the percentage 
change in the official exchange rate). 
 
Financial development 
We use two measures of financial intermediation: the ratio of total liquid 
liabilities (M3) to GDP, which serves as a proxy for the size of the financial system; and 
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, a measure of availability of credit in 
the domestic financial market. 
 
Governance and the political environment 
Finally, we examine the effects of five indicators of governance and the political 
environment: political freedom and civil liberty; voice and accountability; government 
effectiveness; risk of contract repudiation; and corruption.10  The indexes of freedom, risk 
of contract repudiation, and corruption are available as annual time series, while the other 
two indexes are available as one observation per country.11  For the time-variant indexes 
we relate capital flight to their unpredictable components, obtained as residuals from 
forecasting equations, on the grounds that uncertainty regarding these variables is most 
likely to spark capital flight.12   
 
4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
(a) Methodology 
The existing theory does not offer a clear-cut way of determining a priori which 
independent variables should be included in the empirical model of the determination of 
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capital flight for a particular sample of countries.  Hence we follow a stepwise approach, 
adding explanatory variables one by one and retaining those that are statistically 
significant.  A combination of six explanatory variables remain significant when used 
simultaneously: two lags of capital flight, change in debt, the lag of the debt stock, and 
the lag of the growth rate differential between the African country and its OECD trading 
partners.  We refer to this as the “expanded model”.  The two lags of capital flight and the 
change in debt invariably remain significant when other variables are added to the 
equation one by one.  In contrast, the debt stock, the growth rate differential, and other 
variables are not robust to addition of more regressors.  We refer to the regression in 
which the only explanatory variables are the two lags of capital flight and the change in 
debt as the “base model”.  
 
The model specifications can be represented by the following equation: 
ititiittitiiit CDKFKFKF ε+′+′+α+α+α+α= −−− ZδXβ 1,32,21,10  (2) 
where for a country i at time t, KF is the ratio of real capital flight to GDP, CD is the ratio 
of the change in debt stock to GDP, X  is a vector of other time-varying independent 
variables, Z  is a vector of time-invariant independent variables (the two governance 
indicators), i0α  is a country-specific intercept representing unobservable individual 
characteristics, and ε  is a white noise error term.  To allow for country-specific fixed 
effects, we mean-difference all time-varying variables.13  The regressions that include the 
time-invariant indicators (the index of voice and accountability and the index of 
government effectiveness) do not include fixed effects as these would be collinear with 
the time-invariant variables. 
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 We first run the regressions with annual panel data, an approach that not only 
maximizes the degrees of freedom but also allows us to analyze the dynamic effects of 
past capital flight through the inclusion of lagged values.  In these regressions, we test 
and correct for serial correlation of the error term as needed, using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation procedure (see Griffiths, Hill, and Judge 1993).  As a check on the 
robustness of our results, we then collapse the data into a single cross-section where each 
country has one observation, consisting of the means of the time-varying factors and the 
values of the time-invariant factors.14   
 
As discussed above, there may be a two-way relationship between external 
borrowing and capital flight.  To investigate this possibility, we  test for endogeneity of 
the change in debt (CD) by estimating the following equation: 
 ititit CDKF ξ+φ+φ= 10       (3) 
where ξ  is an error term with the standard properties.  We use the Hausman (1978) test 
to test for endogeneity, using lagged values of change in debt and capital flight as 
instruments.  The results indicate no statistically significant simultaneity bias.15  We 
therefore retain contemporaneous change in debt in the model, a specification that allows 
us to examine whether capital flight is fueled by external borrowing.  To address possible 
simultaneity problems for other time-varying independent variables, we use the first lags 





The results of the regressions using annual pooled data are reported in Tables 3a 
and 3b, and the results of cross-sectional regressions are reported in Tables 4a and 4b. 
 
Debt and capital flight 
 Our single strongest finding is that external borrowing is an important 
determinant of capital flight.  In the pooled data analysis, the change in external debt 
invariably has a positive and statistically significant effect, regardless of which additional 
determinants of capital flight are included in the regressions.16  This result is also robust 
in the cross-sectional specification.  The estimated coefficients of the change in debt 
reported in Tables 3a and 3b range from approximately 0.7 to 0.9, with an average value 
of 0.8.  Since both capital flight and change in debt are measured as percentages of GDP, 
this implies that, for every dollar of external borrowing by a SSA country in a given year, 
roughly 80 cents left the country as capital flight.  In the cross-sectional regressions 
reported in Tables 4a and 4b, the estimated coefficients on the change in debt range from 
0.35 to 0.9, with an average value of 0.75. 
 
By including both the change in debt and the one-year lag of the debt stock (again 
as a percentage of GDP) simultaneously in the equation, we are able to assess the relative 
importance of debt-fueled and debt-driven capital flight.  We find that the debt 
stock/GDP ratio has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (Table 3a).  This 
result supports the hypothesis that debt overhang has an independent effect on capital 
flight:  a one-dollar increase in the stock of debt adds an estimated 3.5 cents to annual 
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capital flight in subsequent years.  These results suggest that external borrowing and 
capital flight are linked by both debt-fueled and debt-driven capital flight.17   
 
 Our results also indicate that past capital flight has a positive effect on current 
capital flight.  The coefficients on lagged capital flight are consistently positive and 
statistically significant, a finding that suggests hysteresis, or a tendency for capital flight 
to persist over time.  This may reflect a habit-formation effect, as private actors gain 
experience in capital flight operations.  It may also reflect a contagion effect, as capital 
flight corrodes the legitimacy of capital controls, particularly if the flight capitalists 
include government authorities.  At the same time, capital flight may contribute to the 
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment, in turn sparking further capital flight. 
[INSERT TABLES 3a AND 3b HERE] 
[INSERT TABLES 4a AND 4b HERE] 
 
Effects of the macroeconomic environment  
Our results indicate that the growth rate differential between the African country 
and its OECD trading partners is negatively related to capital flight: higher growth leads 
to less capital flight.  In panel annual data regressions, the negative coefficient on the 
growth rate differential (lagged one year) is statistically significant at the 5% level.  In the 
cross-sectional regressions, the coefficient on the growth differential (measured over the 
period as a whole) is statistically insignificant in the full set of 30 countries, but it is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in the SILIC sub-set.  We obtain 
similar results (not reported here for reasons of space) when we use the African country’s 
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growth rate or the growth rate differential between the African country and the Unites 
States.   
 
The effect of inflation on capital flight is positive but statistically insignificant in 
the regressions with pooled annual data as well as in cross-sectional regressions.18  Again 
we find similar results when instead of the country’s inflation rate we use the inflation 
differential between the African country and the United States.   
 
The regressions with pooled annual data reveal a positive and statistically 
significant effect of exports on capital flight.  The cross-sectional regressions, however, 
yield a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient on the exports/GDP ratio.  The 
results suggest that exports help to explain within-country variations in capital flight over 
time, but not inter-country variations. 
 
Effects of fiscal policy 
 The results on the primary budget surplus are ambiguous: the primary budget 
surplus has a negative and statistically significant effect of on capital flight in cross-
sectional regressions (Table 4a), but the effect is positive and statistically significant in 
regressions with pooled annual data (Table 3a).  Regressions with other fiscal policy 
indicators – the overall deficit/GDP ratio and the tax/GDP ratio – produced statistically 
insignificant coefficients.  As noted before, fiscal data for SSA are not well reported, as 
illustrated by the smaller number of observations in the regressions.  Therefore, no firm 
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conclusions can be drawn from our results on the links between capital flight and fiscal 
policy. 
 
Effects of risk and returns to investment 
 The indicators of risk and returns to investment used in our analysis generally 
have little effect on capital flight.  The estimated coefficient on the difference between 
domestic and U.S. interest rates (adjusted for exchange rate movements) has the expected 
negative sign in both the pooled and cross-sectional regressions, but in neither case is it 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  In other regressions (not reported in the tables 
for reasons of space), we tested for the impacts of the change in the real exchange rate, 
the domestic deposit interest rate, and the spread between the domestic deposit and 
lending rates. The estimated coefficients had the expected negative sign only in the case 
of the change in the real exchange rate, and in no case were they statistically significant.  
These results suggest that conventional portfolio choice considerations, as measured by 
the differential returns to investment and exchange rate risk, have not been important 
determinants of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Financial development 
We find that credit to the private sector has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on capital flight in cross-sectional regressions, and that this effect is nearly 
significant in panel data regressions (with a p-value of 0.11).  This finding is consistent 
with the theory that suggests that financial deepening can reduce capital flight by 
increasing opportunities for domestic portfolio diversification.  Our regression results 
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indicate no significant relationship, however, between liquid liabilities and capital flight.  
The links between financial development and capital flight thus appear to be sensitive to 
the choice of the measure of financial intermediation.   
 
Political and governance indicators 
 Our indicators of the political environment and the quality of governance are 
defined such that a higher value indicates a better environment in the cases of political 
freedom, voice and accountability, and government effectiveness; higher values for the 
risk of contract repudiation and corruption variables, on the other hand, indicate a worse 
environment.  In the pooled data analysis, the estimated coefficients on all five variables 
have the expected signs but they are statistically significant only in the cases of voice and 
accountability and corruption.  In the cross-sectional regressions, the coefficient on 
government effectiveness again has the expected sign and is close to being statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.11, while the coefficients on the other indicators are 
statistically insignificant.  The weak explanatory power of the indicators of the political 
environment and governance is possibly due to the relatively small variation in their 
values both over time and across the countries in our study.19   
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The foregoing analysis has implications both for “debt relief” policies and for 
policies to reduce future capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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(a) Implications for debt relief 
In recent years, the debilitating effects of high external debt burdens on 
developing countries have prompted widespread support for debt cancellation.  The 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative is an important step in this 
direction, but much remains to be done to pull African economies out of the high-debt, 
high-poverty trap.   
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests an additional rationale for 
the annulment of debts.  Private capital flight from SSA countries constitutes a large 
fraction of the total debt owed by these countries (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001).  
Furthermore, the results presented here indicate that to a large extent this capital flight 
was financed by foreign borrowing, a phenomenon we term debt-fueled capital flight.  
This implies that creditors knowingly or unknowingly financed the export of private 
capital rather than investment (or, for that matter, consumption) in African economies.  
Such lending was often motivated by political and strategic considerations.  In the Congo 
(former Zaïre), for example, creditors continued to lend to the regime of the late president 
Mobutu despite ample knowledge that much of the borrowed funds were in fact being 
diverted into private assets (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998).  In such circumstances, the 
ordinary people of sub-Saharan Africa may rightly ask why they, rather than the holders 
of the private assets that are the counterparts of public liabilities, should bear the 
responsibility for servicing the resulting debts. 
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 The phenomenon of debt-fueled capital flight implies a lack of diligence – if not 
active complicity – on the part of creditors.  Well-functioning credit markets require that 
creditors face the consequences of irresponsible or politically motivated lending.  A 
strategy of selective disengagement by successor governments from “odious debts” 
contracted by predecessor regimes therefore would be consistent with economic logic, as 
well as building upon precedents in international law (Boyce 1993, 2002).  In this 
strategy, successor governments would accept liability for those portions of the public 
debt that were used to finance bona fide investment or public consumption, while 
repudiating liability for those portions for which no such use can be demonstrated.  From 
the standpoint of successor governments, a potential drawback of the selective 
disengagement strategy is the danger that creditors will retaliate by withdrawing or 
rationing subsequent lending.  Against this potential cost, however, the government must 
weigh the potential savings via reduced debt service payments.  In SSA countries, where 
the net transfer (new borrowing minus debt service payments) has often been negative in 
the past decade,20 these immediate benefits may well outweigh the costs.  Moreover, in 
the long run, if lenders do apply stricter criteria with respect to the uses to which their 
loans are put, so as to protect themselves from the threat of selective disengagement in 
future years, this arguably would be a desirable change from the standpoint of most 
citizens in the borrower countries.  
 
 In addition to greater accountability on the creditor side, it is equally important 
that debtor countries establish mechanisms of transparency and accountability in their 
own decision-making processes with regard to foreign borrowing and the management of 
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borrowed funds.  Since, in the absence of debt cancellation or selective disengagement, 
the burden of debt repayment ultimately lies with the population of the debtor countries, 
it is appropriate to require debtor governments to provide information to the public – just 
as they report to their creditors – and to ensure public representation in the management 
of public debt.  In the future, greater accountability on the part of both borrowers and 
creditors will be needed to prevent new cycles of external borrowing, capital flight, and 
financial distress.   
 
(b) Capital flight: policy responses 
 The hemorrhage of capital from sub-Saharan Africa points to the need for policies 
designed to stem further capital outflows and encourage the repatriation of legitimate 
private capital now held abroad.   
 
Prevention 
 The evidence in this study and in several prior studies suggests that once capital 
flight begins, it tends to persist.  The best way to stop capital flight therefore is to prevent 
it in the first place.  At the same time, the evidence that much of the capital flight from 
SSA countries is debt-fueled suggests that efforts to promote more responsible lending on 
the part of creditors, and more accountable borrowing and debt management on the part 
of debtor governments, could help to rein in capital flight once it has begun.   
 
Our results also suggest that capital flight can be reduced by strategies to promote 
growth, deepen financial markets, improve governance, and reduce debt overhang.  These 
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“push” factors generally appear to be more significant as predictors of capital flight than 
measures of relative risks and returns suggested by conventional portfolio theory.  Steps 
to level the legal and administrative playing field for domestic investors and to promote a 
stable macroeconomic environment could contribute to these goals.  African countries not 
only need to curb the de facto privatization of public assets (that leaves the corresponding 
liabilities in public hands), but also must endeavor to keep legitimate private capital at 
home by encouraging domestic investment. 
 
 Capital controls, another potential policy tool to reduce capital flight, have been 
out of fashion in recent years, but deserve consideration as one element of a broader 
policy mix.  Some critics have argued that capital controls amount to “attacking the 
symptom rather than the underlying causes of the capital flight problem” (Cuddington 
1986: 33).  Others have argued that capital controls are either pernicious, preventing 
countries from reaping the benefits of free international financial markets (Khan and 
Haque 1985; Fischer 1999), or ineffectual since private actors find ways of 
circumventing them (Edwards 1999).  As Bhagwati (1998) points out, however, 
proponents of free capital mobility fail to provide convincing evidence of the expected 
gains, while ignoring or downplaying the losses from financial crises associated with 
unregulated capital movements.  Blinder (1999: 57) warns that “the hard-core 
Washington consensus – which holds that international capital mobility is a blessing, full 
stop – needs to be tempered by a little common sense.”  In sub-Saharan Africa, common 
sense may indicate that most countries do not meet the necessary conditions for 
benefiting from full capital account openness, including low barriers to international 
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trade, a well-developed, well-diversified, and well-regulated financial system, and no 
large differences with other countries’ tax regimes on capital (see Cooper 1999).21  There 
is some empirical evidence that developing countries that maintained capital controls in 
the past experienced relatively lower capital flight (Pastor 1990).  Capital controls cannot 
substitute for accountability and sound macroeconomic management, but they may be 
useful in dampening the effects of shortcomings on these fronts, shortcomings that will 
be inevitable even in the best of transitions from “here” to “there.”  
 
Repatriation  
 A number of policies have been proposed to entice private holders of external 
assets to repatriate their capital.  Two of the most important are tax amnesties and raising 
domestic real interest rates.  Tax amnesties involve the write-off of past tax liabilities on 
assets that were sent abroad, as well as tax exemptions for future earnings on repatriated 
private capital.  One problem with this strategy is that private capital held abroad is not 
homogeneous.  The pool includes capital acquired legally at home and transferred legally 
abroad, capital acquired legally at home but transferred abroad by illicit means, and 
private capital acquired illegally at home and funneled abroad illegally.  Granting tax 
breaks to the latter types of capital not only rewards illicit activities, but also undermines 
the credibility of government policies (Dornbusch 1987). 
 
The use of domestic real interest rates to induce capital repatriation also has 
serious limitations.  Our results indicate that relative returns to capital have not been an 
important determinant of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa.  This implies that efforts 
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to lure capital back by raising domestic interest rates are not likely to be terribly 
successful.  At the same time, the adverse macroeconomic and sectoral effects of high 
interest rates may outweigh any potential gains from capital flight repatriation, as higher 




 This paper has explored the causes of capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa, a 
region that is still struggling with the debilitating effects of the debt crisis.  Our findings 
indicate that external borrowing is the single most important determinant of capital flight.  
In the 1970-1996 period, roughly 80 cents on every dollar that flowed into the region 
from foreign loans flowed back out as capital flight in the same year, suggesting that the 
phenomenon of debt-fueled capital flight was widespread.  In addition, every dollar added 
to the stock of external debt added roughly three cents to the annual capital flight in 
subsequent years, suggesting that outflows were exacerbated by the phenomenon of debt-
driven capital flight.  These findings imply that debt relief strategies will bring long-term 
benefits to African countries only if accompanied by measures to prevent a new cycle of 
external borrowing and capital flight.  This will require substantial reforms on the part of 
both creditors and debtors to promote responsible lending and accountable debt 
management.   
 
 Our results also indicate that past capital flight tends to persist over time, and 
provide fairly robust support for the propositions that capital flight is negatively related to 
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the growth rate differential between the African country and its OECD trade partners, the 
volume of domestic credit to the private sector, and a political-governance index of voice 
and accountability.  These findings suggest that capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa 
can be reduced by improvements in these broader dimensions of economic performance 




                                                 
NOTES 
 
1 Conceptually, some authors have attempted to distinguish “capital flight” from “normal 
capital outflows” on the basis of its motivations or consequences (for discussion, see 
Lessard and Williamson 1987: 201-4).  When it comes to practical measurement, 
however, it is difficult to do so.  Like most authors, we therefore use the term “capital 
flight” to refer to all resident capital outflows from SSA, excluding recorded investment 
abroad. 
 
2 We eliminate Tanzania from the Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) sample due to lack of 
adequate data on other variables.  We include revisions to the capital flight series for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo for the period 1990-1996 based on data from the World 
Development Indicators 2000.  
 
3 The World Bank classifies a country as severely indebted if “either the present value of 
debt service to GNP exceeds 80 percent or the present value of debt service to exports 
exceeds 220 percent” (World Development Indicators 2000).  In 1996 a country was 
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classified as low-income if its per capita GNP was less than or equal to $785 (World 
Development Indicators 1998).   
 
4 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) report that the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP 
is a strong predictor of the risk of civil conflict, a result they attribute to the potential for 
warring parties to capture “lootable” resources. 
 
5 Hermes and Lensink (2000) measure uncertainty of government tax policy by the 
unpredictable component of the tax/GDP ratio obtained as a residual from a forecasting 
equation specified as a second-order autoregressive process including a time trend. 
 
6 Theoretically, the overvaluation of a currency is determined in relation to some 
equilibrium exchange rate.  In practice, a proxy typically is obtained by choosing a given 
year or period in which it is believed that a country had the appropriate (market-
determined) exchange rate.  Departure from this benchmark exchange rate is then 
interpreted as exchange rate misalignment (overvaluation or undervaluation).  
Cuddington (1986) and Pastor (1990) choose 1977 as the equilibrium year for Latin 
American countries.  Murinde, Hermes, and Lensink (1996) and Hermes and Lensink 
(1992) choose the year 1984 for sub-Saharan African countries.  Lensink, Hermes, and 
Murinde (1998) use the annual percentage change in the real effective exchange rate.  




                                                                                                                                                 
7 Other commonly used measures of financial development include the M3/GDP ratio and 
various measures of the banking sector and stock market activity. For discussions of these 
measures, see Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), Levine (1997), and Lynch (1996). 
 
8 On trade misinvoicing, also see Bhagwati (1964) and Gulati (1987).  See Boyce and 
Ndikumana (2001) for details on data sources and the algorithms used to adjust debt 
flows for cross-currency exchange rate fluctuations and for the computation of net trade 
misinvoicing. 
 
9 The reasons for these anomalous findings for these five countries, all in francophone 
West Africa, warrant further investigation. 
 
10 These indicators – like other measures of the quality of governance and the political 
environment – are open to criticism on both conceptual and data-quality grounds.  Yet the 
fact that something is difficult to measure does not imply that it is unimportant.  For this 
reason, we examine a variety of indicators. 
 
11  In the original sources, the indexes of risk of contract repudiation and corruption are 
reported on a scale of 0 to 10 such that a high number corresponds to low risk and low 
corruption.  We transform the indexes (by subtracting the original value from 10) so that 
a high value indicates higher risk and higher corruption. 
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12 The unpredictable component is obtained as the residual from the following forecasting 
equation (estimated by country): ttt tXX ε+γ+γ+γ= − 2110 , where X is the index of 
political freedom, risk of contract repudiation, or corruption, t is time, and ε  is a 
stochastic error term.  A similar approach is used by Hermes and Lensink (2000) to 
examine the effects of political and governance indicators. 
 
13 Since this is a dynamic model including lags of the dependent variable, random-effects 
estimation is not appropriate (correlation between the unobserved component and the lags 
of capital flight violates the orthogonality condition for consistency of random-effects 
estimates).  For this reason we use the fixed-effects estimation method.  For further 
discussions of the estimation of fixed-effects models with panel data, see Wooldridge 
(2002); Hsiao (1986); and Andersen and Hsiao (1981, 1982).  F-tests indicate that 
country-specific effects are significant.  In the benchmark model, for example, the F-
statistic is 4.0 (with a critical value of 1.86 at the 1% level). 
 
14 In the cross-section regressions, a country’s growth rate is obtained from an OLS 
regression of the logarithm of real per capita GDP on time over the relevant period.   
 
15 If the change in debt is endogenous, the ordinary least squares estimate OLS,1φˆ  will be 
inconsistent and will differ statistically from the instrumental-variable estimate iv,1φˆ .  We 
compute the Hausman specification test statistic m as follows: 
)]ˆvar()ˆ/[(var()ˆˆ( OLS,1,1
2
OLS,1,1 φ−φφ−φ= ivivm ; it is distributed as .)1(2χ   The m 
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statistic for our sample is 0.03 (the critical value is 6.6 at the 1% level and 2.7 at the 10% 
level).  For discussion of the Hausman test, see also Griffiths, Hill, and Judge (1993). 
 
16 The result also holds if we limit the sample to the SILIC subset or if we drop Nigeria 
from the sample as an outlier (not reported here for reasons of space). 
 
17 The cross-sectional results in Table 4 do not permit us to differentiate between the two 
linkages, since the average change in debt is roughly proportional to the average debt 
stock. 
 
18 To permit non-linearity in the impact of inflation, we include a quadratic term. 
 
19 For example, on a 0-to-12 scale of the political freedom index, 23 of the 30 countries 
score a mean value between 1 and 3 (see Table A3). 
 
20 The net transfer on debt in the period 1990-98 was negative for the 30-country group 
taken as a whole, amounting to -0.5 percent of GNP.  The largest negative net transfers 
were recorded by the Republic of Congo (-6.7% of GNP) and Nigeria (-5.95% of GNP).  
Excluding Nigeria, the net transfer for the other 29 countries amounted to 0.8% of GNP 
in this period. 
 
21 See Edwards (1999) for a review of the literature on capital control effectiveness.  See 
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Table 1: Selected Empirical Studies on Determinants of Capital Flight 
 




Fiscal policy Risk and 
returns to 
investments 
Financial depth Political and 
governance 
factors 











Debt flows (+) Growth (0); 
inflation (0) 
Budget surplus 




































Debt flows (+) Inflation (+); 
lagged capital 
stock (-) 
 Deposit rate (-); 
expected change 










 Growth (0); 
inflation (+) 
 




















 Political shock 
dummy (0) 
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Table 1 (continued) Selected Empirical Studies on Determinants of Capital Flight 
 
Authors Sample  Capital flows Macroeconomic 
environment 
Fiscal policy Risk and 
returns to assets 
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Table 1 (continued) Selected Empirical Studies on Determinants of Capital Flight 
 
Authors Sample  Capital flows Macroeconomic 
environment 
Fiscal policy Risk and 
returns to assets 











for Mexico  
 
Debt flows (+); 
past capital 
flight (+) 
Growth (-)  Expected 
relative returns 
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Table 1 (end) Selected Empirical Studies on Determinants of Capital Flight 
 




Fiscal policy Risk and 
returns to assets 






































(+); tax (+); 
deficit (+); 
interest rate (+); 
inflation (0) 
 














aid (+); FDI 
(0);  











(including sub-set of 








 Dollar distortion 
index (squared) 
(+); investor risk 
(residuals) (0) 
M2/GDP (0) Governance 
indicators (0) 
 
Notes: Symbols in parentheses denote a statistically significant positive effect (+); no statistically significant effect (0); or a statistically significant negative 
effect (-).  Where more than one symbol appears in parentheses, this indicates that different specifications yielded different results or that the results vary by 
country. 
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Table 2: Indicators of Capital Flight from 30 Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996 






Cumulative stock of capital 
flight  
(including interest earnings) 
Net external assets 
   Value (1996 m$) % of GDP  
Angola 1985-1996 17032.5 20405.0 267.8 9179.9 
Benin 1974-1996 -3457.4 -6003.8 -271.9 -7598.1 
Burkina Faso 1970-1994 1265.5 1896.6 96.5 700.4 
Burundi 1985-1996 818.9 980.9 108.9 -146.0 
Cameroon 1970-1996 13099.4 16906.0 185.6 7364.4 
Central African 
Republic 
1970-1994 250.2 459.0 50.8 -482.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1970-1996 10035.4 19199.9 327.1 6373.5 
Congo, Rep. 1971-1996 459.2 1254.0 49.6 -3986.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 1970-1996 23371.0 34745.5 324.7 15221.9 
Ethiopia 1970-1996 5522.8 8017.9 133.4 -2060.7 
Gabon 1978-1996 2988.7 5028.1 87.0 717.7 
Ghana 1970-1996 407.3 289.3 4.2 -6152.9 
Guinea 1986-1996 342.8 434.2 11.0 -2806.1 
Kenya 1970-1996 815.1 2472.6 26.8 -4458.4 
Madagascar 1970-1996 1649.0 1577.5 39.5 -2568.3 
Malawi 1970-1994 705.1 1174.8 93.8 -971.3 
Mali 1970-1996 -1203.6 -1527.2 -57.5 -4533.2 
Mauritania 1973-1995 1130.8 1830.0 167.4 -572.2 
Mauritius 1975-1996 -267.8 465.9 10.8 -1351.7 
Mozambique 1982-1996 5311.3 6206.9 218.4 -1359.4 
Niger 1970-1995 -3153.1 -4768.9 -247.7 -6392.1 
Nigeria 1970-1996 86761.9 129661.0 367.3 98254.4 
Rwanda 1970-1996 2115.9 3513.9 249.9 2470.8 
Senegal 1974-1996 -7278.1 -9998.2 -214.9 -13661.1 
Sierra Leone 1970-1995 1472.8 2277.8 257.1 1072.7 
Sudan 1970-1996 6982.7 11613.7 161.1 -5358.3 
Togo 1974-1994 -1382.1 -1618.3 -155.4 -3149.0 
Uganda 1970-1996 2154.9 3316.1 54.8 -358.3 
Zambia 1970-1991 10623.5 13131.2 354.9 5491.8 
Zimbabwe 1977-1994 8222.3 10882.9 149.0 6074.8 
Total  186796.9 273824.3 171.9 84956.5 
 
Sources: For SILIC countries: Boyce and Ndikumana (2001). Series for non-SILIC countries are computed following 
the methodology in Boyce and Ndikumana (2001).  
a  Net external assets = accumulated capital flight (with imputed interest earnings) minus stock of debt..
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Table 3a: Determinants of Capital Flight: Fixed-Effects Regressions with Pooled Annual Data 









Primary budget  
surplusb 
(6) 
Interest rate  
differentialc 




































Debt stock (DEBT-1)  0.035 
(3.9) 
    
Growth differential (DGROECD-1)  -0.116 
(-2.3) 
    
Inflation (INFL-1)   0.001 
(0.1) 
   
Inflation squared (INFL-1)2   0.00008 
(0.6) 
   
Exports (EX-1)    0.115 
(2.1) 
  
Primary budget surplus (PBS-1)     0.167 
(1.7) 
 
Interest rate differential (RDIF-1)      -0.018 
(-1.4) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.54 0.36 
F-test (all coefficients = 0) 145.2 93.5 76.8 108.7 77.4 50.6 
Number of observations 586 577 440 578 257 348 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of capital flight to GDP.  The t-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
a  The regressions with inflation exclude the DRC and Angola (due to extremely high inflation rates), and Benin  and Guinea (due to lack of data).   
b  The regressions with the primary budget deficit exclude the DRC, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Sudan, and Uganda (due to lack of data). 
c The regressions with the interest rate differential (with exchange rate adjustment) exclude Angola, Benin, the DRC, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, 
and Sudan (due to lack of data).
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Table 3b: Determinants of Capital Flight: Fixed-Effects Regressions with Pooled Annual Data 



























1st lag of capital flight  















2nd lag of capital flight  





























Liquid liabilities  
   (M3-1) 
0.018 
(0.3) 
      
Credit to the private  
   sector (CRED-1) 
 -0.110 
(-1.6) 
     
Political freedom  
   (FREE-1) 
  -0.506 
(-1.5) 
    
Voice and accountability  
   (VOICE) 
   -0.970 
(-1.8) 
   
Government effectiveness  
   (GOVEFF) 
    -0.928 
(-1.4) 
  
Risk of contract  
   repudiation (CONT-1) 
     1.615 
(1.4) 
 
Corruption (COR-1)       2.581 
(1.7) 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.49 
F-test (all coeff. = 0) 106.7 105.8 101.3 118.3 119.4 110.3 111.1 
Observations 573 565 547 585 532 456 456 
The dependent variable is the ratio of capital flight to GDP.  The t-statistics are given in parenthesis.   
a For the regressions with indexes of voice and accountability and government effectiveness, the data are not mean-differenced because these two indexes are 
available as one observation per country. 
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Initial capital flight  
   (KF0) 
0.134 
(1.3) 
       
Change in debt  

















Growth differential  
   (DGROECD) 
 -0.485 
(-0.8) 
      
Inflation (INFL)   0.118 
(0.8) 
     
Inflation squared  
   (INFL2) 
  -0.0005 
(-0.3) 
     
Exports (EX)    -0.023 
(-0.3) 
    
Primary budget  
   Surplus (PBS) 
    -0.724 
(-3.0) 
   
Interest rate  
   differential (RDIF) 
     -0.04 
(-0.8) 
  
Liquid liabilities  
   (M3) 
      0.015 
(0.1) 
 
Credit to private  
   sector (CRED) 
       -0.199 
(-1.9) 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.42 0.08 0.17 0.28 
F-test (all coeff. = 0) 5.0 54.8 3.0 4.0 9.2 0.9 4.0 6.5 
Observationsa 30 30 26 30 24 22 30 30 
 
The dependent variable is the country’s average ratio of capital flight to GDP over the relevant period.  The t statistics are given in parenthesis. 
a For excluded countries in some regressions, see Table 3. 
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Table 4b: Determinants of Capital Flight: Cross-Section Regressions 
 


































Political freedom (FREE) -0.134 
(-0.2) 
    
Voice and accountability (VOICE)  -2.121 
(-1.5) 
   
Government effectiveness  
   (GOVEFF) 
  -2.864 
(-1.6) 
  
Risk of contract repudiation  
   (CONT) 






    0.484 
(0.5) 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.21 
F-test (all coeff = 0) 4.0 5.5 6.2 4.1 4.1 
Observations 30 30 27 24 24 
 




Table A1: Real Capital Flight (million 1996 US $) for 30 SSA Countries 
 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Angola NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Benin NA NA NA NA 70.1 -5.6 -157.2 -85.4 -144.5 -167.3 -599.1 
Burkina Faso 50.4 49.3 15.1 19.6 122.1 -46.4 -14.1 105.6 167.6 36.2 139.5 
Burundi NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Cameroon -84.7 -31.6 -267.7 -474.6 -21.7 144.4 -110.0 462.7 128.1 -392.8 232.1 
Central African Rep. -15.3 17.4 21.4 76.2 -4.5 -7.2 31.5 -25.7 -25.0 -11.1 -10.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 801.6 263.8 849.9 1907.2 1534.9 99.8 465.3 -1567.2 2002.9 771.9 916.1 
Congo, Rep. NA -51.4 -11.5 116.9 -231.5 -494.3 -853.3 -60.5 253.0 234.4 439.6 
Côte d’Ivoire 267 306.2 388.2 481.0 244.4 853.5 576.5 1969.2 1404.6 260.5 1323.6 
Ethiopia 31.9 -10.2 -530.7 78.8 -97.5 -76.7 -217.5 -113.2 17.6 -106.9 -168.1 
Gabon NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 450.5 675.0 397.4 
Ghana -53.3 -294.1 317.8 370.4 -610.4 133.3 -370.2 114.4 -37.3 110.4 304.3 
Guinea NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Kenya 36.4 90.4 84.1 412.1 526.6 449.4 345.8 84.6 190.8 -38.4 77.9 
Madagascar 22.6 1381.2 270.4 -82.7 655.4 180.7 -1327.7 1424.4 -1170.0 -85.1 -300.1 
Malawi 11.1 88.5 -35.4 161.9 143.2 192.9 161.1 156.7 52.7 -352.1 -63 
Mali 58.2 -88.9 51.2 80.0 50.4 -62.2 -131.6 -35.2 -2.2 -230.8 58.5 
Mauritania NA NA NA 304.1 408.6 -214.8 230.6 57.4 75.5 -106.7 4.1 
Mauritius NA NA NA NA NA NA 140.2 92.9 100.2 71.3 136.8 
Mozambique NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Niger 55.2 62.4 83.1 104.2 -180.8 -193.8 -320.4 -321.6 1.0 -478.5 88.1 
Nigeria -485.1 -564.2 626.1 3634.8 1448.2 1857.7 4162.4 9022.8 4060.4 -612.9 2093.1 
Rwanda -106.1 30.7 24.7 34.4 34.9 67.7 77.0 119.0 288.7 320.9 223.8 
Senegal NA NA NA NA -329.9 -67.5 -222.6 63.8 -102.1 -506.0 -135.9 
Sierra Leone 42.9 236.0 32.6 299.0 185.3 -26.8 92.8 92.2 3.7 29.3 57.1 
Sudan 45.3 107.2 -226.8 115.8 673.8 270.5 307.4 206.3 -215.7 545.2 1004.1 
Togo NA NA NA NA 160.6 -183.4 28.5 273.9 94.3 160.8 -50.4 
Uganda 213.2 67.9 6.2 136.7 64.1 -23.3 51.8 -306.3 -90.7 325.2 70.4 
Zambia 1386.4 1328.7 104.4 260.7 -393.4 104.3 84.3 605.2 455.5 944.3 -274.6 
Zimbabwe NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 98.3 403.9 -118.6 238.4 
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Table A1 (continued): Real Capital Flight (million 1996 US $) for 30 SSA Countries 
 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Angola NA NA NA NA 2452.0 724.2 2803.8 533.4 1144.7 731.9 
Benin -532.3 -771.6 -96.9 -98.6 -174.3 -60.4 -60.7 -102.1 254.7 -212.4 
Burkina Faso 86.9 79.8 55.9 48.5 -47.0 52.7 36.5 -7.3 23.1 77.8 
Burundi NA NA NA NA 82.7 103.5 181.2 20.6 34.4 -5.1 
Cameroon 222.6 329.6 629.2 1900.0 -244.0 2166.4 1271.3 427.8 1371.0 1083.3 
Central African Republic 132.3 62.6 42.4 51.3 28.4 1.5 44.2 28.7 -36.0 -104.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1715.9 530.0 289.2 -79.8 778.2 366.4 514.7 -585.6 -292.2 183.8 
Congo, Rep. -240.5 623.2 392.2 690.4 688.5 -326.8 886.8 -390.2 215.6 -177.8 
Côte d’Ivoire 289.6 969.5 183.3 212.7 701.0 1015.2 1718.5 1033.7 1375.9 2703.4 
Ethiopia 772.2 1649.2 618.8 185.6 707.6 421.3 1340.0 -471.1 -270.9 425.1 
Gabon 45.9 223.2 304.7 -47.1 24.6 -292.8 255.0 -122.2 267.1 406.6 
Ghana -638.9 100.9 422.4 464.0 -77.0 -489.6 387.2 -333.5 301.5 59.4 
Guinea NA NA NA NA NA 120.1 217.9 48.4 -328.0 171.9 
Kenya -331.4 -123.7 241.3 -431.3 625.0 -259.4 567.4 -310.3 -333.8 316.7 
Madagascar -408.2 -72.0 -156.9 190.7 -14.4 92.1 314.2 -110.0 -479.2 -69.2 
Malawi -30.5 -4.8 88.5 -89.4 141.1 149.4 177.0 142.4 326.0 55.2 
Mali 70.4 30.0 83.7 201.3 -145.6 -282.6 -121.5 -310.3 -169.7 65.9 
Mauritania -28.8 80.9 101.7 127.8 82.6 -61.5 2.7 -21.9 -150.1 115.9 
Mauritius 331.2 109.8 5.4 -3.1 -13.4 -36.4 -228.4 -165.4 -215.5 27.4 
Mozambique NA -398.3 -110.9 830.1 1373.8 121.8 84.3 -299.0 -223.5 175.7 
Niger -185.0 -364.7 29.4 49.0 15.0 -92.3 -209.9 -131.5 -533.5 44.2 
Nigeria 9293.6 -509.4 2836.1 341.2 2443.8 5835.9 5762.2 2164.5 2314.7 5105.5 
Rwanda -24.4 42.4 32.4 77.0 89.5 131.5 153.9 153.9 15.3 133.5 
Senegal -183.1 -278.0 -135.3 -126.6 -436.0 -161.4 -52.2 -549.0 -1139.7 -140.5 
Sierra Leone 72.3 -158.8 78.6 31.6 -34.0 56.2 91.7 21.8 20.2 13.6 
Sudan 303.7 -182.8 -97.0 1405.1 398.2 -161.8 599.1 61.5 2192.5 845.8 
Togo -95.4 -245.7 -379.7 -198.4 -90.1 -137.7 -83.7 -55.3 14.7 -141.5 
Uganda 219.0 197.8 178.5 260.8 35.0 76.4 329.8 -207.2 -10.5 142.4 
Zambia 914.2 -493.1 41.1 284.8 274.6 1099.4 830.1 825.9 1488.2 743.9 
Zimbabwe 891.9 977.8 528.1 383.0 150.6 487.6 991.2 187.4 718.0 314.7 
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Table A1 (end): Real Capital Flight (million 1996 US $) for 30 SSA Countries 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Angola 2002.7 1820.7 1438.0 1526.2 1566.9 288.0 
Benin -308.9 -24.5 -175.5 101.0 4.6 -110.7 
Burkina Faso -40.6 139.7 87.6 26.9 NA NA 
Burundi 23.8 63.9 86.9 49.7 203.5 -26.4 
Cameroon 815.1 1545.1 426.8 820.6 421.4 329.2 
Central African Republic 70.5 -89.0 -24.9 -5.2 NA NA 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -513.6 -646.7 -166.7 241.7 270.2 -616.9 
Congo, Rep. -82.3 353.2 38.9 -372.7 255.4 -1435.9 
Côte d’Ivoire 1758.9 1314.3 1570.5 -1574.5 1429.4 594.8 
Ethiopia 380.8 395.8 263.4 452.5 71.5 -226.3 
Gabon 160.0 -127.7 -97.0 146.5 54.7 264.5 
Ghana -358.3 144.9 -224.2 196.3 84.5 382.5 
Guinea 21.0 -55.7 243.9 64.3 -73.6 -87.4 
Kenya -6.8 -263.7 -194.1 -205.3 -15.9 -719.3 
Madagascar 416.8 298.3 103.6 286.1 451.0 -163.1 
Malawi -181.8 -180.6 -109.5 -295.6 NA NA 
Mali -83.4 255.6 -51.3 -429.3 68.6 -132.8 
Mauritania 14.4 -249.5 169.5 61.6 126.4 NA 
Mauritius -76.8 -41.6 -178.2 -158.5 -7.0 -158.7 
Mozambique 191.5 709.9 336.2 2201.4 63.0 255.4 
Niger -370.3 57.2 -70.0 -170.6 -118.9 NA 
Nigeria 8387.7 5688.6 4066.9 2851.8 1475.5 3459.9 
Rwanda 103.6 2.7 -29.9 -37.6 81.6 74.6 
Senegal -662.6 -530.6 -599.4 -431.5 -49.6 -502.4 
Sierra Leone 215.6 310.0 102.6 31.8 -424.5 NA 
Sudan -199.8 122.6 154.6 82.6 -198.6 -1176.1 
Togo -306.9 -48.0 -154.0 55.4 NA NA 
Uganda 41.0 70.5 54.0 250.8 24.9 -23.3 
Zambia 8.6 NA NA NA NA NA 
Zimbabwe 459.8 1103.4 478.4 -71.0 NA NA 
Sources: Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) for SILIC countries; series for non-SILIC countries are computed using the methodology in Boyce and Ndikumana (2001). 
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Table A2: Variables: Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Dependent variable 
 




I. Capital flows 
 
CD  Change in debt (adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations) as 
% of GDP, annual series 
World Bank (2000b) 
DEBT Total debt stock as % of GDP World Bank 
(2000b), World 
Bank (2000a) 
II. Macroeconomic environment 
 
GR  Annual growth rate of real per capita GDP World Bank (2000a) 
DGRUS  Growth differential (domestic minus USA) World Bank (2000a) 
DGROECD  Growth differential (domestic minus OECD trading 
partners) 
Easterly and Yu 
(2000) 
INFL Inflation rate = growth rate of the CPI index World Bank (2000a) 
DINFL  Inflation differential (domestic minus USA) World Bank (2000a) 
EX 
 
Exports/GDP ratio World Bank (2000a) 
III. Fiscal policy 
 
BS Overall budget surplus (deficit) as % of GDP World Bank (2000a) 
PBS Primary budget surplus (deficit) as % of GDP  World Bank (2000c) 
TAX 
 
Tax revenue as % of GDP  World Bank (2000a) 
IV. Risk and returns to investment 
 
CREER  % change in real effective exchange rate REER (index 
1995=100), where REER = CPI / (official exchange rate * 
CPI_USA) 
Easterly and Yu 
(2000) 
REDP Deposit interest rate World Bank (2000d) 
SPREAD Spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate World Bank (2000d) 
RDIF Deposit interest rate differential: domestic rate - US TBill 
rate - % change in exchange rate; where exchange rate = 





V. Financial development 
 
M3  Liquid liabilities as % of GDP  World Bank (2000a) 
CRED 
 
Credit to private sector as % of GDP  World Bank (2000a) 
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Table A2 (continued): Variables: Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
VI. Political and governance variables 
 
FREE FREE =  
14 – political rights index – civil liberties 
index 
Freedom House (2001) 
VOICE Voice and accountability Kaufman et al. (1999) 
GOVEF Government efficiency Kaufman et al. (1999) 
CONT Risk contract repudiation* Political Risk Services (2000) 
COR Corruption* Political Risk Services (2000) 
 
Note: * The indexes of contract repudiation and corruption are transformed as: 10 – 
original value; so a high value indicates a worse situation. 
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Table A3: Country Means of Regression Variables 
 
Country KF CD GR INFL PBS RDIF M3 CRED FREE VOICE GOVEF CONT COR 
              
Angola 19.2 11.7 -4.3 3028 -16.8 131 33.6 4.2 1 -1.00 -1.39 6 7 
Benin -8.5 5.2 0.2 14.6 5.5 -1.2 22.8 21.1 3 0.69 -0.07 NA NA 
Burkina Faso 2.5 2.7 1.2 3.2 -9.3 -1.3 15.8 13.4 4 -0.21 -0.21 5 6 
Burundi 5.6 5.3 -2.3 9.7 -2.1 -1.5 18.6 14.0 1 -1.29 NA NA NA 
Cameroon 3.9 5.0 1.1 9.1 -2.3 -0.2 19.5 21.0 2 -0.70 -0.64 4 7 
C. A. R. 1.4 3.9 -1.5 3.6 -5.7 -0.5 17.5 11.2 2 -0.04 -0.05 NA NA 
Congo, DRC. 1.9 5.1 -3.9 1270 NA NA 13.0 2.5 1 -1.57 -1.77 6 9 
Congo, Rep. -1.0 11.5 1.7 9.1 -1.6 -0.3 17.6 16.8 3 -0.77 -0.58 6 7 
Côte d’Ivoire 7.9 8.3 -1.6 8.7 0.6 -1.3 28.8 33.5 3 -0.57 -0.18 3 7 
Ethiopia 5.9 9.4 -1.0 6.8 -4.9 1.6 35.2 9.4 1 -0.49 -0.15 5 4 
Gabon 3.1 3.6 -1.2 6.2 -1.0 0.1 18.5 16.1 3 -0.31 -1.13 4 8 
Ghana 0.4 4.2 -1.1 40.5 -2.5 10.2 18.5 4.7 3 -0.43 -0.29 4 8 
Guinea 1.1 5.6 1.1 NA -1.8 13.6 7.1 4.2 1 -0.87 -0.03 6 7 
Kenya 0.5 4.5 0.8 13.9 6.1 1.1 32.0 27.7 3 -0.70 -0.90 4 7 
Madagascar 2.0 5.0 -2.1 15.5 -2.7 14.2 18.6 16.7 5 0.31 -0.29 7 6 
Malawi 2.4 7.3 0.1 18.3 -3.6 6.0 21.5 12.4 2 0.06 -0.62 5 6 
Mali -2.0 5.7 -0.4 4.9 -1.8 -1.3 19.2 17.0 3 0.41 -0.05 7 9 
Mauritania 4.7 12.3 -1.4 7.2 4.4 -2.1 20.8 28.6 1 -0.97 NA NA NA 
Mauritius 0.9 4.5 3.8 10.1 0.9 3.6 55.4 30.5 10 1.01 0.17 NA NA 
Mozambique 12.2 17.0 1.5 46.7 -2.9 NA 34.0 24.7 2 -0.17 -0.33 5 6 
Niger -4.9 3.1 -2.4 6.6 -2.6 -1.3 14.0 12.2 2 -0.74 -1.39 5 6 
Nigeria 8.4 3.7 -1.0 24.8 0.5 2.0 21.9 10.6 4 -1.23 -1.32 5 9 
Rwanda 4.3 2.7 -0.4 9.0 -4.1 -1.4 14.7 6.0 2 -1.17 NA NA NA 
Senegal -6.9 5.2 -0.5 8.0 -0.3 -1.2 25.6 30.7 6 -0.29 0.05 5 7 
Sierra Leone 4.7 4.6 -1.5 41.9 -9.4 10.3 16.0 4.8 3 -1.62 0.01 6 8 
Sudan 1.6 6.7 0.0 45.9 NA -1.1 22.8 8.8 2 -1.49 -1.70 7 9 
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Table A3 (continued): Country Means of Regression Variables 
 
Country KF CD GR INFL PBS RDIF M3 CRED FREE VOICE GOVEF CONT COR 
              
Togo -5.8 7.5 -1.4 7.8 -0.7 -1.2 34.6 23.7 2 -1.05 -0.37 5 8 
Uganda 3.1 5.2 2.0 71.6 -2.4 11.0 11.2 3.6 3 -0.52 -0.25 6 8 
Zambia 12.0 11.6 -2.2 79.6 -0.7 1.0 29.5 15.0 5 -0.04 -0.40 6 8 
Zimbabwe 5.2 3.3 0.6 16.4 -2.3 4.4 22.4 22.8 4 -0.67 -1.13 5 7 
              
Samplea 2.9 6.4 -0.5 20.2 -2.9 1.5 22.7 15.6 2.9 -0.55 -0.56 5.3 7.3 
 
KF = capital flight /GDP; CD = change in debt / GDP; GR = growth of per capita GDP; INFL = inflation; PBS = primary budget surplus/GDP; RDIF = deposit rate – TBill rate; 
M3 = M3/GDP; CRED = credit to the private sector/GDP; FREE = political freedom (=14 – political rights – civil liberties); VOICE = voice and accountability; GOVEF = 
government effectiveness; CONT = risk of contract repudiation; COR = corruption. 
a For each variable, the sample average (simple averages, not weighted) is computed by considering only countries that are included in the relevant regression 
sample (see notes to Tables 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b). 
 
